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A Societal Agreement on
Prevention
In late 2018, a National Prevention Agreement was
signed by the government of the Netherlands, in collab-
oration with local governments and 70 other societal
partners, representing public and private, for profit
and non-profit organizations (VWS, 2018). The
National Prevention Agreement focuses on three
common themes related to non-communicable diseases:
the prevention of overweight and obesity, of smoking
and of excessive alcohol intake. The ambitions are high:
the partners to the agreement commit themselves to the
objectives that in 2040 no adolescents will smoke any-
more; that the prevalence of overweight of persons
above 20 years will have declined from 50 per cent to
38 per cent; and that not more than 5 per cent of adults
drink too much alcohol. The measures include amongst
others smoke-free schoolyards, a ban on in-school sale
of sugared drinks and healthier food offers in company
restaurants, school canteens and the creation of more
attractive parks and public spaces. The opportunities for
the marketing of unhealthy products at children will be
constrained. Retailers will not promote alcoholic drinks
with special offers that offer more than 25 per cent price
reductions. The agreement foresees tax increases on to-
bacco products: in a few years cigarettes will cost E10
per pack.
Prominent examples of possible policies that were not
proposed are sugar or junk food taxes, and a drastic
restriction of places where tobacco products could be
sold. NGOs and public health professionals also com-
plain that the agreement largely consists of voluntary
steps that will not be enforced; a limitation that is argu-
ably due to the fact that the government was keen to
keep all parties—notably private companies such as the
large retailers—on board. The RIVM (National Institute
of Public Health and Environment) does not expect that
the ambitions will be realized given the measures that
are agreed upon (RIVM, 2018). However, the RIVMwill
have the task to monitor the program and the progress
that will be made, and the idea is that more strict meas-
ures will be taken if necessary. The prevention agree-
ment is seen as expressing a collective responsibility
for health that is shared by government, societal part-
ners and citizens—although the latter were only repre-
sented via the democratically elected government and
ultimately by parliament.
Is Responsibility for Health a
‘Zero-Sum Game’?
Notwithstanding the critique that one can have of the
contents of the agreement, the current government has
clearly chosen a different road than the previous
Minister of Health, who was highly reluctant to
expand the role of government in preventing what
might be called ‘lifestyle’ diseases. In her 2011 policy
brief (VWS, 2011), she claimed that healthy lifestyles
had been considered for too long a responsibility of
professionals and government, with a focus on what
individuals should (not) do, leaving too little responsi-
bility for individual persons themselves. Responsibility
for healthy behaviour should be given back to where it
belonged, that is, to each individual for herself. This idea
fits, of course, clearly in a liberal discourse that rejects
paternalism. For liberals and many others, the vice of
paternalism is not just that it involves constraints on
liberty; state paternalism is especially objectionable as
far as it involves taking responsibility for someone’s
wellbeing rather than allowing that person be
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responsible for her own life. That would be like treating
that person as a child that cannot care for herself, and
seeing the state as a parent (or worse: nanny) that takes
the responsibility that a child-like citizen lacks. On the
other hand, respecting a competent individual that is
capable of autonomous choice would involve emphasiz-
ing her own individual responsibility for health and thus
reducing the sphere of responsibility of the state. (Of
course, there is far more to say about paternalism in
public health (Nys, 2008; Wilson, 2011)).
This way of reasoning is not uncommon in antipa-
ternalist thought. It apparently presupposes a view of
responsibility for health as being a ‘zero-sum game’
(Grill and Nihle´n Fahlquist, 2012; Verweij, 2014): if
one party assumes more responsibility (notably govern-
ment or other societal organizations) this would come at
the cost of others that also have (or should have) re-
sponsibility—as if responsibility is like a pie that is to be
divided between people that each will have a smaller or
larger share. Does this assumption hold? Discussing this
issue can offer some clarity about what it means for
various parties to share responsibility, and in that way
it also may help to clarify the normative implications of
seeing health as a collective, shared responsibility either
in the way that the current Dutch prevention agreement
suggests or in other ways that are implied or claimed in
public health theory and practice.
The problem with discussions about ‘responsibility’ is
that the term can refer to various concepts that may
partly overlap or relate to one another but are clearly
distinct. Hence, one attempt to clarify discussions about
responsibility for health is to tease out these different
meanings and argue which of these concepts should be
central to specific policies, communications or norma-
tive arguments. This is what some of the papers in this
issue of Public Health Ethics aim to do—notably the
paper by Brown and colleagues. Offering an encompass-
ing systematic analysis of responsibility concepts goes
beyond the scope of this editorial, but one can at least
identify differences between responsibility as being
backward-looking or forward-looking (cf. Nihle´n
Fahlquist, 2006); as accountability or attributability
(cf. Scanlon, 1998; Watson, 2004); as moral or causal
responsibility; or as a matter of prudence (Brown et al.,
2019). Moreover, the term can refer to a task, to an ob-
ligation or to a virtue (Nihle´n Fahlquist, forthcoming).
Arguably, for some of these concepts, the presump-
tion of responsibility as a ‘zero-sum game’ might hold. It
would sometimes make sense if we are talking about
subtasks that are assigned to different parties to achieve
a specific goal. If some do more, they might do others’
jobs, and thus there would be less for those others to do.
The presumption of responsibility as a ‘zero-sum game’
might also hold in cases of causal responsibility: the
larger the causal role of one determinant might imply
that other factors are less important for a certain event
to occur. Analogously, if moral responsibility for a cer-
tain event (for example, me getting drunk) can be attrib-
uted to different agents (myself, the bartender, my
friends who encouraged me to take another drink),
who, looking back, all contributed to the event, then if
some played only a very small part, others will be more
responsible, and vice versa.
In our view, the issue of paternalism and individual
versus government responsibility for health is primarily
a matter of forward-looking responsibility that focuses
on the normative reasons government and citizens have
to promote and protect health. In this context, there is
no ground for assuming that a stronger role for govern-
ment would imply a smaller responsibility for individ-
uals, or vice versa. This is because ethical reasons and
objectives of the state to promote healthy behaviour are
different from individual persons’ reasons to take care of
their own health. For example, taking care of my own
nutrition and health is advisable for prudential and
moral reasons: it serves my own good and it protects
my ability to care for my family and fulfil other duties.
These prudential and moral reasons for making healthy
choices can be very strong, but that does not downplay
the moral reasons that the state has to promote healthy
nutrition as well. From a public health perspective, it
would actually be unfair to leave all responsibility for
healthy nutrition to individual citizens themselves. It
might be fair if everyone had an equal chance to a
healthy way of living. But in fact huge inequalities
exist within populations and therefore the state has rea-
sons of justice to take on responsibility for healthy nu-
trition. Other normative grounds for health policies
include the prevention of harm to others or the protec-
tion of public goods within a solidaristic health system
(Davies and Savulescu, 2019). Promoting healthy nutri-
tion via information, education or nudges will clearly
not push aside or diminish the reasons that individuals
have to care about their own nutrition. But even if the
sale of certain products would be banned (e.g. super-
sized soda-drinks, as in the controversial New York pro-
posal by Michael Bloomberg) this is not making the
responsibility of individuals smaller—they still have
their own reasons for being concerned about their
health, and they still have ample opportunities to take
care of, or neglect their own health. In the context of the
forward-looking responsibilities of individual citizens
and the government—but also for societal organizations
and private companies—responsibility for health is not
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a ‘zero-sum game’. Different parties have different
moral and prudential grounds as well as variable oppor-
tunities for caring about healthy behaviour. These rea-
sons do not necessarily compete, or overtake one
another.
Sharing Responsibility for
Prevention
Acknowledging that responsibility for health is not a
‘zero-sum game’—not even if the focus is on healthy
or unhealthy behaviour—can help take out the sting
of some criticism of governmental public health activ-
ities. Public health authorities that aim at creating better
social conditions for health, or at a reduction of health
inequalities, or at less harmful environments, are not
robbing individual citizens of their responsibility.
They are taking their own public responsibility and do
not usurp a citizen’s individual responsibility for health.
Acknowledging that there are different moral
grounds for responsibility for (promoting and protect-
ing) health, and that different actors can have different
moral reasons for contributing to health, may also shed
some light on the normativity of the prevention agree-
ment in the Netherlands or on similar public–private
partnerships for health.
One interpretation of the agreement would be that it
forms the basis for each party’s responsibility, and that
government, and public and private partners have
agreed who should do what (hence a division of tasks)
to meet the overall ambitions of the agreement. On this
interpretation their shared responsibility looks like a
‘zero-sum game’ indeed; at least if the number and
scope of tasks is limited and as far as doing more than
agreed implies taking over the tasks of others. This in-
terpretation however does not make much sense. First
because there is arguably much more that every party
can do to promote health without taking away possibi-
lities for others. More importantly, all parties have their
ownmoral grounds for promoting health and refraining
from contributing to ill-health. These do not collide or
compete, and, moreover, they serve as the basis for each
actor’s responsibility—a basis that is independent of the
strength, validity or desirability of the agreement as
such. Much has been written, particularly in this jour-
nal, on the various ethical grounds for the state to pro-
mote health. But these justifications for public health
activities do not negate moral principles underlying
responsibilities of, for example, private companies to
promote and protect health as well: obligations of
industry and retailers to refrain from harming people
by selling products that undermine health; to mitigate
structural inequities (Tempels et al., 2017); to protect
and strengthen autonomous choice (nudges for health;
refraining from all-too-persuasive strategies to sell
energy-dense foods or drinks; abandoning child-mar-
keting); or to ensure the safety and nutritious quality
of food; etc.
If we acknowledge that governments as well as public
and private organizations all have compelling ethical
reasons to promote and protect health, this implies
that it is not so much a ‘national agreement’ or
public–private partnership that defines what the scope
of their responsibility is. A societal agreement like the
one signed in the Netherlands should be seen as express-
ing, not as underpinning or defining their responsibility.
A relevant implication is that responsibility may well go
beyond what is agreed. Another implication is that these
‘shared responsibilities’ are not mutually conditional. If
some party at some point steps out of the agreement this
will not affect their responsibility or that of the remain-
ing parties. Their responsibility for health is warranted
independent of the agreement they have made.
Responsibility in Public Health
Ethics
In this issue of Public Health Ethics we have collected a
variety of papers, dealing with different senses, dimen-
sions and implications of responsibility for health. Neil
Levy argues that discussions about individual responsi-
bility for health should take into account that capacities
and circumstances necessary for responsible choice are
distributed unequally, and that discussions should focus
more on holding those responsible who determine the
ways in which capacities and circumstances are distrib-
uted (Levy, 2019). Rebecca Brown and colleagues also
criticize the emphasis on individual moral responsibility
for health in health policies. Instead, they propose to
shift the attention to a prudential (hence non-moral)
understanding of responsibility (Brown et al., 2019).
Kathryn Mackay reflects on their proposal and indicates
a potential weakness in their view (Mackay, 2019). The
connection between responsibility and solidarity is dis-
cussed by Davies and Savulescu: they argue that health
care systems that are grounded in solidarity, under cer-
tain conditions, have the right to penalize some users
who are responsible for their poor health (Davies and
Savulescu, 2019). Davies and Savulescu’s normative
analysis offers an interesting counterpoint to Gloria
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Traina’s empirical study of Norwegian citizens’ views of
personal responsibility for health. The results of their
survey suggest that a significant support for social re-
sponsibility does not exclude a strong support for per-
sonal health responsibility (Traina et al., 2019).
We look forward to receiving more work on this com-
plex topic. A systematic analysis of the different con-
cepts of responsibility for health, overseeing their
implications for specific discussions in public health
ethics would be especially welcome.
References
Brown, R. C. H., Maslen, H., and Savulescu, J. (2019).
Against Moral Responsibilisation of Health:
Prudential Responsibility and Health Promotion.
Public Health Ethics, 12, 114–129.
Davies, B., and Savulescu, J. (2019). Solidarity and
Responsibility in Health Care. Public Health Ethics,
12, 133–144.
Grill, K., and Nihle´n Fahlquist, J. (2012). Responsibility,
Paternalism and Alcohol Interlocks. Public Health
Ethics, 5, 116–127.
Levy, N. (2019). Taking Responsibility for Responsibility.
Public Health Ethics, 12, 103–113.
MacKay, K. (2019). Reflections on Responsibility and
the Prospect of a Long Life. Public Health Ethics, 12,
130–132.
Nihle´n Fahlquist, J. (2006). Responsibility Ascriptions
and Vision Zero. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 38,
1113–1118.
Nihle´n Fahlquist, J. (forthcoming) Public Health and
the Virtues of Responsibility, Compassion and
Humility. Public Health Ethics, doi: 10.1093/phe/
phz007.
Nys, T. R. V. (2008). Paternalism in Public Health Care.
Public Health Ethics, 1, 64–72.
RIVM (2018). Quickscan Mogelijke Impact Nationaal
Preventieakkoord. Bilthoven: Rijksinstituut
Volkgezondheid en Milieu.
Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other.
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University.
Tempels, T., Verweij, M., and Blok, V. (2017). Big
Food’s Ambivalence: Seeking Profit and
Responsibility for Health. American Journal of
Public Health, 107, 402–406.
Traina, G., Martinussen, P. E., and Feiring, E. (2019).
Being Healthy, Being Sick, Being Responsible:
Attitudes towards Responsibility for Health in a
Public Healthcare System. Public Health Ethics, 12,
145–157.
Verweij, M. F. (2014). Curiosity and Responsibility.
Philosophy in Relation to Healthy Food and Living
Conditions. Wageningen: Wageningen University.
VWS (2011). Gezondheid Dichtbij. Den Haag:
Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport.
VWS (2018). Nationaal Preventie Akkoord. Den Haag:
Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport.
Watson, G. (2004). Agency and Answerability. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wilson, J. (2011). Why It’s Time to Stop Worrying
about Paternalism in Public Health Policy. Public
Health Ethics, 4, 269–279.
102  VERWEIJ AND DAWSON
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/phe/article-abstract/12/2/99/5537721 by Landbouw
universiteit user on 02 M
arch 2020
